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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency
of economy-wide capital allocation, and identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from
an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect
investor protection, conglomerates that engage in “winner-picking” (Stein, 1997) find it optimal
to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy
have higher productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal
capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal
capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other
firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated
with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial
development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated for example by the
control of the corporate sector by family business groups, may decrease the efficiency of the capital
market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that
ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal
evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new
independent firms due to lack of finance.
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1 Introduction
During the 1990s business groups in developing countries, and specially in East Asia, have been
under pressure to restructure. Although widely regarded as the engine of economic growth in
earlier decades, business groups are now blamed by politicians and commentators for the economic
problems (slow growth, financial crises, etc.) affecting some regions of the world. Those against
the busting up of business groups contend that these organizations substitute for missing markets
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 1999). For example, the presence of business groups may improve
economic efficiency because their internal capital markets allocate capital among member firms more
efficiently than the underdeveloped external capital market does (Hoshi, Kashyap,and Scharfstein,
1991; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Stein, 1997; Perotti and Gelfer, 2001). In contrast, those in favor
of dismantling business groups argue, among other things, that business groups inhibit the growth
of small independent firms by depriving these firms of finance.1
Existing models of internal capital markets consider conglomerates in isolation, abstracting from
the effects that conglomeration might have on other firms in the economy (see Stein, 2003, for a
survey of the literature on internal capital markets).2 However, the argument that conglomeration
makes it harder for small independent firms to raise financing is directly suggestive of such external-
ities. Is it reasonable to expect that high conglomeration will have negative effects on a country’s
capital market? If this conjecture is true, it gives rise to important welfare and policy implications.
Even if conglomerates’ internal capital markets are efficient (in the sense that conglomerates allo-
cate capital to divisions with the highest growth opportunities), one cannot infer that the presence
of conglomerates should be encouraged because the benefits of efficient internal capital markets
could be outweighed by the negative externalities that conglomerates impose on other firms in the
economy. To address these questions, we need an equilibrium model that considers both internal
and external capital markets, and the interactions between them. We present such a framework in
this paper.
1See, for example, the article “Small business living with the crumbs” in the The Financial Times of April 23,
1998, for an account of the difficulties that independent firms faced in obtaining finance before the reform of the
Korean chaebols.
2We use the term conglomerate and business group interchangeably. Although these organizations are different in
many respects (for instance a business group is formed by legally independent firms while a conglomerate is typically
a single firm with multiple divisions) they both have internal markets that allocate capital among the member firms
in the case of business groups (Samphantharak, 2003) and among divisions in the case of conglomerates (Lamont,
1997).
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In our model, capital allocation is constrained by the extent of legal protection of outside
investors against expropriation by the manager or ‘insiders’ (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). When
investor protection is low, there is a limit to the fraction of cash flows that entrepreneurs can
credibly commit to outside investors (limited pledgeability of cash flows). Because of this friction,
the economy has a limited ability to direct capital to its best users: high productivity projects
might not be able to pledge a sufficiently high return to attract capital from lower productivity
projects.
In this set up, a conglomerate that reallocates capital efficiently (Stein, 1997) allocates the
capital of a worthless project to its best unit, even if this unit is of mediocre productivity. A
conglomerate prefers this internal reallocation even when there are higher productivity projects
in the economy in need of capital, because, due to limited pledgeability, the high productivity
projects cannot properly compensate the conglomerate for its capital. In contrast, a stand-alone
firm with a worthless project has no internal reallocation options, and thus it finds it optimal to
supply the project’s capital to the external market. This difference in the reallocation decisions of
conglomerates and stand-alones means that a high degree of conglomeration in a country’s corporate
sector is associated with a smaller supply of capital to high productivity firms and might, under
some conditions, decrease the efficiency of aggregate investment.
The model also suggests specific conditions under which conglomerate’s internal capital markets
increase allocative distortions. For very low levels of investor protection conglomerates actually
improve allocative efficiency because the external market works so poorly that high productivity
firms cannot raise additional capital irrespective of the amount of capital supplied. Because released
capital cannot find its way to high productivity projects, the reallocation of conglomerates to
mediocre units is better than no reallocation. For very high investor protection, the conglomerates’
internal reallocation bias disappears because high productivity projects can offer a sufficiently high
return to attract capital from the conglomerate. In this case, the external market works so well that
the allocation of capital becomes independent of the degree of conglomeration. The negative effect of
conglomeration on the external capital market is most pronounced for intermediate levels of investor
protection. In such circumstances, the legal and contracting environment is good enough to make
it possible for the external capital market to work well. However, the external market’s residual
underdevelopment makes it fragile to the negative externality engendered by conglomeration. In
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other words, for intermediary levels of investor protection the probability that high productivity
firms can raise additional capital is very sensitive to capital supply, and thus to the degree of
conglomeration. In these cases, the efficiency of capital allocation decreases with conglomeration.
Our theory thus predicts that, in some circumstances, an exogenous decrease in conglomeration
can improve the efficiency of capital allocation by increasing the availability of finance to high
productivity projects. This prediction is consistent with anecdotal evidence from South Korea.
The financing constraints that new independent firms faced in the 1990’s were partly attributed
to the presence of the chaebols.3 It also appears that following the reform of the chaebols, more
funds have become available to independent firms.4 Korea also appears to be at the intermediate
stage of institutional development in which the equilibrium effects of internal capital markets are
particularly high. In particular, it is possible that while chaebols played an important role in
earlier stages of development of the Korean capital market, it has more recently become a burden
as market institutions evolved over time.
Clearly, the degree of conglomeration is not completely exogenous since individual firms have
the choice whether to conglomerate. Nevertheless, there is evidence that, in many countries, cor-
porate grouping affiliation is determined to a large extent by history and political pressure (see
references in section 4). Thus, we believe that it is meaningful to model exogenous variations in
conglomeration. However, we extend the model to allow firms to choose whether to form con-
glomerates or not. We show that similar results hold when we allow the degree of conglomeration
to be endogenously determined. The model has multiple equilibria with high and low levels of
conglomeration and, under certain conditions, the equilibrium with high level of conglomeration
has worse capital allocation because of the negative externality associated with conglomeration.
In addition, we show that despite the negative effects of conglomeration, individual firms have no
private incentives to split up if the economy finds itself in the high conglomeration equilibrium.
Deconglomeration might have to be centrally mandated, or directly discouraged through policies
that increase the cost of conglomeration.
Our results contribute to the literature on whether internal capital markets are efficient (Gert-
ner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; Stein, 1997) or not (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan, Servaes and
3See reference in footnote 1.
4See for example The Economist, April 17 2003, “Unfinished business”.
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Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000). We are not the first to point out that conglomerates
may have a negative effect on the allocation of capital. Other models also have the implication
that, as the financing-related benefits of conglomeration decrease, costs of conglomeration such as
less effective monitoring (Stein, 1997), coordination costs (Fluck and Lynch, 1999), free cash-flow
(Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002 and Inderst and Mueller, 2003) and incentive problems (Gautier and
Heider, 2003) make conglomerates less desirable. However, the literature has focused on conglom-
erates in isolation and thus has not generated equilibrium implications.5 Our paper, by focusing on
the interactions between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency of the external
capital market, generates a new theoretical insight as well as novel empirical implications and policy
recommendations.
In terms of the theoretical insight, we add to the literature by identifying a novel, equilibrium
cost of conglomeration that stems from the negative externality that conglomerates impose on a
country’s external capital market. This cost implies that conglomerates can be simultaneously
detrimental to equilibrium capital allocation, and efficient at allocating capital internally.
In addition, our model generates new testable hypotheses and policy recommendations. For
example, we predict that a high degree of conglomeration in a country’s corporate sector might
increase financing constraints for independent firms that lie outside the conglomerate. We also
provide reasons for why the dismantling of conglomerates might need to involve government in-
tervention (see section 6 for a complete list and a discussion of empirical implications and policy
recommendations). These implications cannot be generated by models that consider conglomerates
in isolation.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature that examines the equilibrium implications
of private capital allocation decisions in economies characterized by limited investor protection
(Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Almeida and Wolfenzon 2004; Castro Clementi, MacDonald, 2004)
and to an earlier literature that analyzes the relationship between general financing frictions and
capital allocation (Levine, 1991; Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr, 1995). However, this literature has
not considered the equilibrium effects of conglomerates’ internal capital markets, which is the main
focus of this paper.
5Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002) are an exception: they analyze allocation decisions by conglomerates in an
equilibrium context, but with no role for financial imperfections.
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We start in the next section by presenting a very simple example that illustrates the main effect
that drives the novel results of our paper. In section 3 we describe our full model, and in section 4
we analyze the relation between the level of conglomeration and the efficiency of capital allocation.
The main result of the paper is stated and explained in section 4.4. In section 5, we extend the
model to analyze the implications of endogenizing conglomeration. We discuss the empirical and
policy implications of the model in section 6, and present our final remarks in section 7. All proofs
are in the Appendix.
2 A simple example
In this section we present a simple example that illustrates the intuition behind the main results of
the full fledged model. The example is designed to highlight the equilibrium cost of internal capital
markets that we identify in the simplest possible way. We consider a more general set up starting
in section 3.
Consider an economy with three investment projects, each with a different productivity. An
investment of one unit of capital produces a payoff of 5 units if invested in project H (high pro-
ductivity project), 3 units if invested in project M (medium productivity) and 1 unit if invested
in project L (low productivity). There is only one unit of capital to be allocated and this unit
happens to be invested in project L.
The main friction in this economy is that cash flows cannot be fully pledgeable to outside
investors (we discuss this assumption in Section 3.4). We denote by λ the fraction that can be
pledged to outsiders. Furthermore, in the spirit of Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) and Stein
(1997), we assume that conglomerates’ internal capital markets alleviate the limited pledgeability
problem that distorts capital allocation in external markets. Specifically, we assume that there is
no pledgeability problem for units of capital that are reallocated inside the conglomerate.
We characterize the equilibrium allocation of the unit of capital for two different economies. In
the first economy, the three projects are stand-alone firms. In the second economy, projects L and
M are part of a two-project conglomerate, while project H is a stand-alone firm. As a benchmark,
note that the efficient allocation of capital in both situations is from project L to H, generating a
total payoff of 5.
When there are no conglomerates, all capital reallocations must occur through the external
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capital market. Firm L can keep the unit of capital and produce an output of 1. Alternatively, it
can supply this unit to any of the other two firms. Due to limited pledgeability, the maximum firm
M can pay is 3λ, and the maximum firm H can pay is 5λ. Therefore, conditional on the decision
to provide the capital to the market, the stand-alone firm L allocates this capital to project H for
a total economy payoff of 5. However, when pledgeability is low (in particular when λ < 15) firm L
prefers to keep the capital rather than to supply it to the market.
In the second economy, project L (with its unit of capital) is in the conglomerate. The conglom-
erate can leave the capital in project L and generate 1 or it can choose to reallocate this unit of
capital. By allocating internally to project M, the conglomerate achieves a payoff of 3, whereas by
allocating to project H through the external capital market, it can achieve a payoff of 5λ. Thus the
conglomerate always reallocates (since max{3, 5λ} > 1) but, when λ < 35 , it reallocates internally
to project M instead of externally to project H.
It is now easy to see how conglomerates’ (efficient) internal capital markets can distort the
equilibrium allocation of capital. If 15 ≤ λ < 35 , the economy achieves a total payoff of 5 if there are
no conglomerates, but it achieves a payoff of 3 when there is a conglomerate present. Notice that
the inefficiency comes about precisely because the conglomerate is performing a privately efficient
reallocation of capital. This inefficiency is the novel (equilibrium) cost of internal capital markets
that we identify in the paper.
This simple example also shows that the effect of internal capital markets on the equilibrium
allocation depends non-monotonically on the pledgeability parameter λ. If pledgeability is very
low (λ < 15), the conglomerate’s internal capital reallocation is socially useful because it increases
the total payoff from 1 to 3. This is a situation in which the external capital market is very
poorly developed. The social cost of conglomeration appears at intermediate levels of pledgeability
(15 ≤ λ < 35). For these intermediate levels the external capital market has the potential to
work well, but it is sensitive to the presence of conglomerates. The economy would benefit if the
conglomerate was dismantled. Finally, for higher levels of pledgeability (λ ≥ 35), the conglomerates’
internal reallocation bias disappears since the high productivity project can offer a high return
for the unit of capital. In this case, the economy can achieve the efficient allocation of capital
irrespective of the level of conglomeration.
A useful way of understanding this result is as follows. A stand-alone firm faces the same
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Figure 1: Timing of events
pledgeability problem for all firms in the economy. As a result, conditional on liquidating a project,
the stand-alone firm ranks all projects in the socially optimal way (recall the stand-alone firm
compares 3λ to 5λ). However, the conglomerate faces pledgeability problems only for firms outside
the conglomerate (recall the conglomerate compares 3 to 5λ). Thus, a conglomerate has a bias
towards internal reallocation. This capital allocation distortion is the cost of conglomeration. The
benefit of conglomeration is that, because of capital market imperfections, conglomerates reallocate
capital more frequently than stand-alone firms. In sum, conglomerates reallocate capital more
frequently but these allocations are not always the socially optimal ones.
As we show in the next few sections, this simple example delivers the same result as our full
model. However, this example is artificial in several important dimensions. First, it assumes an
extreme scarcity of capital (only one unit needs to be allocated to three competing investment
projects). Second, it assumes a particular location for the unit of capital and a particular distri-
bution of productivities in the conglomerate and stand-alone firm (that is, the high productivity
project lies outside the conglomerate, in which the entire wealth of the economy is invested). Third,
the (re)allocation of capital in the external market is not explicitly modeled. Fourth, the variation
in the level of conglomeration is assumed to be exogenous. We tackle these issues in the general
model that starts in the next section.
3 The model
In this section we develop our full theoretical framework to analyze the effect of conglomeration on
the equilibrium allocation of capital.
The timing of events in the model is shown in Figure 1. There are three dates. At date t0,
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there is a set J (with measure 1) of entrepreneurs, each with one project (projects are described
below) and one unit of capital.6 At this date entrepreneurs decide whether to form a conglomerate.
The productivity of projects is not known at date t0 when conglomerates are formed, however, it
becomes public knowledge before date t1. In light of the new information, capital can be reallocated
among projects at date t1. Reallocation can occur in the external capital market or, when projects
are in a conglomerate, it can occur internally. We assume that, in addition to the entrepreneurs,
there is a group of investors with an aggregate amount of capital K > 1.7 Finally, cash flows are
realized at date t2.
3.1 Conglomerate formation
At date t0 entrepreneurs form conglomerates. We restrict attention to two-project conglomerates.
The intuition holds for conglomerates of any finite number of projects.8 We assume that the
entrepreneurs that form a conglomerate maximize the conglomerate’s total payoff at date t2.
After entrepreneurs make their conglomeration decisions, the boundaries of the firms in the
economy can be described by a partition E of J, where each element F ∈ E is a firm (stand-alone
or conglomerate). For example, if project i ∈ J ends up as a stand-alone firm, then {i} ∈ E , and if
projects j, k ∈ J form a conglomerate then {j, k} ∈ E .
We let c be the fraction of the projects that end up in conglomerates. Thus, there are c/2
conglomerates and 1 − c stand-alone firms. We refer to c as the degree of conglomeration in the
economy.
3.2 Projects and the general technology
The projects that entrepreneurs have are of infinitesimal size and, at date t0, require the unit of
capital that entrepreneurs hold. At date t1, a project can be liquidated, in which case the entire
unit of capital is recovered. If a project is not liquidated, it can receive additional capital or can
6Because each entrepreneur is associated with one and only one project, we use interchangeably the terms “en-
trepreneur j ∈ J ”and “project j ∈ J ”.
7This capital is in excess of what is needed to fund every project in the economy with two units (the maximum
that we will allow in the model, as explained below). Thus, unlike in the simple example of Section 2, there is excess
capital in this economy.
8Consider our simple example in section 2. If all three firms are inside the same conglomerate, capital is always
allocated efficiently irrespective of the location of the high productivity project. Notice, however, that for this result
to hold it is crucial that all capital is invested in a single conglomerate.
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be continued with no change until date t2. At date t2, projects generate cash flows.9
Projects can have one of three different productivity levels denoted by L (low), M (medium),
and H (high). The probability that a project is of productivity L, M, and H is pL, pM , and pH
(with pH + pM + pL = 1), respectively. The probability distribution is independent across projects
so that, at date t1, exactly a fraction pL, pM and pH of the projects are of type L, M and H,
respectively.10 After the productivity of the projects is realized, there are three different types of
stand-alone firms (the L , M , and H stand-alone firms) and six different types of conglomerates
(the LL, LM , LH, MM, MH, and HH conglomerates). We let t(j) ∈ {L,M,H} be the realized
productivity of project j.
For simplicity, we assume drastic decreasing returns to scale. Depending on its type, a project
generates cash flow YH , YM or YL (with YH > YM > YL ≡ 0) per unit invested, but only for the
first two units (i.e., the initial unit with which the project is started at date t0 and the unit that
is potentially invested at date t1). Additional units invested generate no cash flow.
At date t1 there is a second technology (‘general technology’) available to all agents in the
economy. We define x(ω) as the per-unit pay off of the general technology with ω being the
aggregate amount of capital invested in it.
Assumption 1 The general technology satisfies:
a. ∂[ωx(ω)]∂ω ≥ 0
b. x′(ω) ≤ 0
We assume that total output is increasing in the amount invested in the general technology
(assumption 1(a)) but that the per-unit payoff is decreasing (assumption 1(b)). To rank the pro-
ductivity of the projects and the general technology, we assume that:
Assumption 2 YM > x(0)
The most productive technologies are good projects, followed by medium projects. By assump-
tion 2, medium projects are more productive than the general technology regardless of the amount
invested in the latter (since x(0) > x(ω) by assumption 1(b)). Finally, the bad projects are the
least productive.
9Because liquidation is costless and there is excess capital, all projects (which are identical ex-ante) will “enter”
date t1 with one unit of capital invested. This assumption makes the model more symmetric than the simple example
of section 2, in which we assumed that only a particular project had capital invested in it.
10Notice that any individual project has the same probability of turning out to be L, M , or H, irrespective of
whether it lies in a conglomerate or not (unlike in the simple example of section 2).
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3.3 External capital markets
At date t1, some firms decide to supply their capital to the market, other firms choose to seek
capital in the market and others opt out of the market completely. We let S be the set of projects
that are liquidated and whose capital is supplied to the external market. That is, if the stand-alone
firm {i} decides to liquidate and supply its capital to the market then i ∈ S. Similarly, if the
conglomerate {j, k} decides to supply the capital of unit j to the market then j ∈ S. The total
supply of capital to the market is then K+
∫
{i∈S} di, where K is the amount of capital in the hands
of other investors.
The rest of the projects are continued until date t2. Some firms with continuing projects benefit
from raising capital in the market at the prevailing market rate. These firms seek external finance.
We let C be the set of projects that form these firms. That is, if conglomerate {j, k} seeks two
units of capital (one for each project) then j, k ∈ C. Also, some conglomerates prefer to allocate
capital internally and neither supply nor demand capital from the external market. We let O be
the set of projects that form these conglomerates.
The actions that take place in the external capital market are as follows. First, firms that
seek finance announce one contract for each unit of capital they desire to raise. Because projects
generate cash out of the first two units of capital, and all projects start with one unit, firms seeking
finance announce one contract per continuing project. It will be convenient to label the contracts
by the project that ultimately receives the capital rather than by the firm that announces it. For
example, we refer to the contract that the stand-alone firm F = {i} announces as P i. Similarly, a
conglomerate G = {j, k} seeking two units of capital announces two contracts P j and P k.
After firms and conglomerates announce contracts, date-t1 investors (investors, stand-alone
firms and conglomerates which supply capital to external market) allocate their capital to these
contracts and to the general technology so as to maximize the value of their investment. Investors
can take any of the contracts offered by any of the firms. An allocation in the capital market can
be described by ri, the probability that an investor takes contract P i, and ω∗, the amount allocated
to the general technology.11
11We characterize the allocation rule by the probability that a contract is taken because we allow investors to
randomize among projects. Of course, after the uncertainty about this randomization is resolved, projects either get
capital or they don’t. However, we specify the allocation rule by the ex-ante probability of getting capital (rather
than the ex-post actual allocation) because this is what matters to firms offering contracts.
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3.4 Limited pledgeability
The allocation of capital in external markets will be affected by an imperfection at the firm level:
firms and conglomerates cannot pledge to outside investors the entire cash flow generated. In
particular, we assume that only a fraction λ of the returns of the second unit invested is pledgeable.12
The limited pledgeability assumption can be justified as being a consequence of poor investor
protection, as shown in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). In their model, insiders can expropri-
ate outside investors, but expropriation has costs that limit the optimal amount of expropriation
that the insider undertakes. Higher levels of protection of outside investors (i.e., higher costs of
expropriation) lead to lower expropriation and consequently higher pledgeability.
Limited pledgeability also arises in other contracting frameworks. For example, it is a con-
sequence of the inalienability of human capital (Hart and Moore 1994). Entrepreneurs cannot
contractually commit never to leave the firm. This leaves open the possibility that an entrepreneur
could use the threat of withdrawing his human capital to renegotiate the agreed upon payments.
If the entrepreneur’s human capital is essential to the project, he will get a fraction of the date-t2
cash flows. Limited pledgeability is also an implication of the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model
of moral hazard in project choice. When project choice cannot be specified contractually, investors
must leave a high enough fraction of the payoff to entrepreneurs to induce them to choose the
project with low private benefits but high potential profitability.
The assumption of limited pledgeability imposes constraints on the amount firms can offer. For
example, the offer P i of a stand-alone firm F = {i} is constrained by
P i ≤ λYt(i). (1)
The constraints on the contracts P j and P k of a conglomerate G = {j, k} with Yt(j) ≤ Yt(k)
seeking two units of capital depend on the number of units raised. When only one of the two
contracts is taken, there are two relevant constraints. The first is a straightforward incentive
compatibility constraint, P j ≤ P k. The conglomerate always allocates the unit raised to its higher
productivity project k. This condition ensures that the conglomerate’s strategy results in capital
being allocated to the project for which the contract was intended to. Under this condition, investors
12The assumption that the cash flows from the first unit are not pledgeable is made only for simplicity. It will
become clear that our results do not hinge on this assumption (see footnote 19).
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prefer contract P k over P j , and will thus take contract P k first.
The second constraint is due to limited pledgeability,
P k ≤ λYt(k). (2)
When the two contracts are taken in equilibrium, the conglomerate allocates one unit to each
project and the relevant constraint is
P j + P k ≤ λ(Yt(j) + Yt(k)). (3)
3.5 Internal capital markets
Once the external capital market closes, we assume that the conglomerate allocates its internal
capital to maximize its total payoff. This assumption implies that the conglomerate will seek to
reallocate capital towards its most productive projects (as in Stein, 1997). Furthermore, as in the
example of Section 2, we assume that there are no pledgeability problems inside a conglomerate,
that is, λ = 1 for capital internal capital reallocations. The assumption that internal capital markets
alleviate the limited pledgeability problem is in the spirit of the models in Gertner, Scharfstein and
Stein (1994), and Stein (1997). Taken together, these two assumptions imply that in our model
conglomerates’ internal capital markets are privately efficient.
Naturally, we recognize that internal capital markets are not always privately efficient (Stein,
2003). The goal of our assumptions is to highlight the novel cost of internal capital markets that
we identify in the paper, which is associated with the effect of internal capital markets on the
efficiency of the external capital market. Given our assumptions, in the absence of an externality
conglomeration would clearly increase the efficiency of capital allocation.
However, it is important to note that our results do not require internal capital markets to be
strictly efficient. First, it is not necessary for λ to be strictly equal to one inside a conglomerate.
As long as conglomerates’ internal capital markets mitigate the limited pledgeability problem that
exists in external capital markets, our results will hold. In other words, what is required is that
λ is higher for capital reallocations that occur inside the conglomerate. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the types of (private) capital allocation distortions that the previous literature
has associated with internal capital markets will most likely reinforce our results. Specifically, if
conglomerates engage in “socialistic” capital allocation (as suggested for example by Rajan, Servaes,
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and Zingales, 2000), their bias for internal allocation will most likely increase, since conglomerates
will be even more reluctant to move capital away from low-productivity units. Given that our
results are driven by conglomerates’ bias for internal allocation, such considerations would only
magnify the externality that we focus on.
4 Conglomerates and the equilibrium capital allocation
We start by assuming that the degree of conglomeration in the economy, c, is exogenously given.
Admittedly, the degree of conglomeration is not completely determined by exogenous factors since
individual firms have the choice whether to conglomerate. Still, there are lessons to be learned to
the extent that there is some exogenous variation in conglomeration across countries. For example,
Khanna and Yafeh (2001, p.9) cite evidence that current corporate grouping affiliation in Japan,
South Korea and Eastern Europe is determined to a large extent by history. Hoshi and Kashyap
(2001) explain how the pre-war Zaibatsu (family-based business groups) were dissolved by the
occupation forces. Moreover, the recent reform of the chaebol in South Korea shows that political
pressure is a force that can shape business groups. In any case, we study the implications of
endogenizing conglomeration in section 5.
We solve the model backwards. Since at date t2 no decisions are taken, we start by characterizing
the internal allocation of funds in a conglomerate.
4.1 Internal allocation of capital
After the external capital market has cleared, conglomerates allocate the capital they have to their
projects, seeking to maximize the conglomerate’s payoff. The allocation rule inside the conglomerate
is as follows.
A conglomerate with two continuing projects and two additional units of capital (i.e., two
units in addition to the two units the projects started off with) allocates one unit to each project.
A conglomerate with two continuing projects and one additional unit of capital allocates this
additional unit to its higher productivity project. Finally, a conglomerate with two continuing
projects and no additional units of capital transfers the unit of capital from its existing lower
productivity project to its higher productivity one. The decision of a conglomerate with a single
continuing project is simple since all it can do is to allocate any additional capital to its continuing
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project.
4.2 Equilibrium of the external capital market
We describe the equilibrium in the external capital market after the productivity of the projects has
been realized. To characterize the equilibrium, we define, for each project i, a quantity P i in the
following way. If project i is in a stand-alone firm then P i ≡ λYt(i). If project i is in a conglomerate
with project j then P i ≡ λYt(i) if Yt(i) ≥ Yt(j) and P i ≡ λ(Yt(i) + Yt(j))/2 if Yt(i) < Yt(j).
We show in the proof of the next proposition that, with this definition of P i, we can treat each
project i ∈ C as if it were a stand-alone firm announcing P i, with P i being the maximum amount
this project can offer in the external market. The intuition is as follows. When project i is in a
stand-alone firm, the maximum it can offer is simply λYt(i) (see Equation (1)). If project i is in
a conglomerate with project j and Yt(i) ≥ Yt(j), the first unit of capital the conglomerate raises is
allocated to project i. The conglomerate can thus offer up to λYt(i) for this unit (see Equation (2)).
Finally, if project i is in a conglomerate with project j and Yt(i) < Yt(j), it only receives capital
when the conglomerate raises two units. The maximum amount per unit that the conglomerate
can offer in this case is λ(Yt(i) + λYt(j))/2 (see Equation (3)).
Proposition 1 For any allocation of projects to stand-alone firms or conglomerates, E , and any
participation decision by firms, sets S, O, and C, the equilibrium of the external capital market is
as follows. All projects with P i ≥ R∗ offer R∗ to investors and projects with P i < R∗ offer any
amount strictly less than R∗. Project i ∈ C receives capital in the external market
• with certainty, if P i > R∗,
• with probability r∗, if P i = R∗, and
• with probability 0, if P i < R∗,
where R∗ satisfies
x−1(R∗) +
∫
{i∈C|P i>R∗}
di ≤ K +
∫
{i∈S}
di ≤ x−1(R∗) +
∫
{i∈C|P i≥R∗}
di (4)
and, r∗ satisfies
x−1(R∗) +
∫
{i∈C|P i>R∗}
di +
∫
{i∈C|P i=R∗}
r∗di = K +
∫
{i∈S}
di. (5)
14
The general technology receives ω∗ = x−1(R∗) units of capital.
The proof of this proposition, as well as a more detailed description of firms’ and investors’
strategies, is in the Appendix. The idea of the proof is as follows. Investors allocate capital so
as to maximize their return. In equilibrium, investors receive a return of R∗ on their investment
because projects that receive capital offer R∗, which is also the return of the general technology.
Projects that do not receive capital are those that are constrained by pledgeability limits to offer
strictly less than R∗. As a result, no investor can achieve a higher return by switching his capital
to an available investment opportunity.
The contracts offered by firms in proposition 1 are optimal given investors’ allocation rule.
Continuing projects that seek finance (those that form set C) offer the minimum possible to receive
one unit of capital.13 Note first that projects that offer strictly less than R∗ do not receive capital
because there are other projects offering this return. Thus, projects that receive capital cannot
profitably deviate to a lower offer. Projects that offer strictly more than R∗ get capital for sure
since all other available investment opportunities offer only R∗. However, in equilibrium, no project
offers more than R∗. First, a project with P > R∗ offers R∗ and receives capital for sure. This
project could potentially offer more than R∗, but it does not need to do so given the equilibrium
allocation rule. And second, a project with P = R∗ receives capital with probability r∗, which is
potentially less than 1. This project would benefit by raising its offer but cannot do so by limited
pledgeability constraints.14 Finally, because a project with P < R∗ has to offer strictly less than
R∗, it never gets capital regardless of its offer.
The above explains that, for a given R and r, the strategies of the projects and of the investors
constitute an equilibrium. The exact values of R∗ and r∗ are determined such that the external
market clears. Recall that the total supply of capital to the market is K +
∫
{i∈S} di. According to
the equilibrium strategies, the total ‘demand’ for capital by projects and the general technology
13We can refer to projects offering contracts (rather than stand-alone firms or conglomerates), because we show
in the proof of Proposition 1 that we can treat each project i ∈ C as a stand-alone firm with the constraint that
P i ≤ P i.
14The fact that projects with P > R∗ receive capital for sure whereas projects with P = R∗ receive capital with
some probability (potentially less than 1) even though these projects offer the same contract is not an assumption,
but rather an implication of equilibrium. As we show in detail in the proof of the proposition, if the allocation rule
assigned capital with probability strictly less than one to projects with P > R∗ then an optimal contract would not
exist for these projects. Under this rule, projects with P > R∗ would get capital with probability strictly less than
one if they offered R∗, but would get capital for sure if they offered R∗+ ². The optimal contract would not not exist
because ² could always be made smaller.
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for a given R and r is x−1(R) +
∫
{i∈C|P i>R} di +
∫
{i∈C|P i=R} rdi. The first term is the amount
of capital allocated to the general technology. The second is the amount of capital allocated to
projects with P i > R, and the third term is the amount of capital allocated to the projects with
P
i = R. Equating supply and demand leads to Equation (5). Equation (4) follows directly from
Equation (5) by imposing the condition that r∗ must lie between 0 and 1.
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2, Panels A and B. The downward sloping curve is the
graphical representation of the demand for capital. In Figure 2, we assume that the set C contains
all the projects in the stand alone firms M and H, and all the projects in conglomerates MM,
MH, and HH.15 At high levels of R (when R > λYH) no project in C can offer a sufficiently high
return to attract capital and thus only the general technology ‘demands’ capital, up to the point
where its return x(ω) = R. At a lower level of R, equal to λYH , projects in C with P = λYH can
attract capital. The demand for capital is then the sum of the amount demanded by the general
technology, x−1(λYH), and the amount demanded by projects in C with P = λYH . Notice that
at R = λYH all firms in C with P = λYH benefit from raising capital. This explains the first
flat portion of the demand curve, which is equal to the entire measure of continuing projects with
P = λYH ,
∫
{i∈C|P i=λYH} di. At a lower level of R, equal to
λ
2 (YH + YM ), conglomerates of type
HM are able to raise two units of capital by pledging exactly λ2 (YH +YM ) for the second unit. The
second flat portion of the curve is the measure of such conglomerates. At an even lower level of
R even projects of type M can raise additional capital, which explains the remaining parts of the
demand curve.
The vertical line is the total supply of capital. As we explain below supply is independent of
the rate of return in our model.
Finally, the equilibrium return R∗ can be read on the vertical axis at the point where the demand
for capital intersects the supply. In Panel A, the equilibriumR∗ is bigger than the maximum amount
that projects can pledge (λYH), and thus only the general technology receives capital.16 In panel
B, R∗ = λYH , and thus all projects in C with P = λYH can attract capital. However, given the
amount of capital supplied there are not enough available funds for all of them. In this case, the
15Also, Figure 2 is constructed under the assumption that x(0) > λYH , such that some capital must be invested in
the general technology before it can flow to projects with P = λYH .
16Notice that in this case r∗, which is the probability that a project with P
i
= R∗ receives capital, can take any
value in [0, 1] since there are no projects with P
i
= R∗. Thus, the equilibrium r∗ is not unique in this case.
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probability that such projects get capital (r∗) is uniquely determined by Equation (5). Graphically,
it is the ratio of the total amount of capital that is available to be allocated to high productivity
projects in set C, which is equal to K+
∫
{i∈S} di−x−1(λYH), to the total measure of such projects.
4.3 Decision to demand, supply or opt out of the market
In this section we analyze the participation decisions of firms, that is, the determination of sets S,
C, and O. As we will show, this will allow us to characterize the demand and the supply of capital
for any levels of conglomeration, c, and pledgeability, λ, and consequently the equilibrium capital
allocation that is associated with each configuration of exogenous parameters.
Proposition 2 The participation decisions of firms are as follows
• Stand-alone firms of type L and conglomerates of type LL supply all their capital to the market
(set S).
• Conglomerates of types LM and LH do not participate in the external capital market and
reallocate internally the capital in the L project to their higher productivity project (set O).
• Stand-alone firms of types H and M , and conglomerates of types MM, MH, and HH seek
finance in the external market for all their projects (set C).
The participation decisions of firms in proposition 2 follow from a restriction that the equilibrium
return R∗ must obey in our model. Notice that because of market clearing, the equilibrium amount
of capital allocated to the general technology (ω∗) must satisfy 0 < ω∗ ≤ 1 + K. From this it
follows that x(1 +K) ≤ R∗ < x(0) and, by assumptions 1 and 2:
YL ≡ 0 < R∗ < YM < YH . (6)
With this restriction, we can derive the sets S, C and O. For stand-alone projects the partic-
ipation decision is straightforward. Low productivity projects supply their capital to the market
since they get R∗ in the market but get zero if they continue. Similarly, conglomerates of type LL
liquidate and supply their capital to the market. The projects of these firms constitute the set S.
The total supply of capital can now be computed as a function of c. There are (1 − c)pL
stand-alone firms with low productivity projects, each supplying one unit of capital, and c2(pL)
2
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conglomerates of type LL, each supplying two units of capital. The supply of capital to the markets
is then
K +
∫
{i∈S}
di = K + (1− c)pL + cp2L. (7)
Equation (7) illustrates a key feature of the model: the higher is the degree of conglomeration,
the lower is the supply of capital. The reason is that while a stand-alone firm with a project of
type L always supplies its capital to the market, conglomerates ML and HL always opt out of the
market because they prefer internal reallocation. As the degree of conglomeration increases, the
number of stand alone projects of productivity L decreases and the number of conglomerates that
opt out of the market increases.
Stand alone projects of productivities M and H, and conglomerates of types HH, MM and
MH generate more cash flow when they continue their projects (either YM or YH) than when
they supply their capital (R∗). Moreover, stand-alone firms with projects M and H benefit from
raising one unit of capital and conglomerates of type HH, MM and MH benefit from raising two
units since they would only pay R∗ but can generate either YM or YH . The projects of these firms
constitute the set C.
We can also compute the precise measure of projects in C with a particular P , as a function of
c and λ. As an example, we compute the measure of projects with P = λYH . There are (1− c)pH
stand-alone firms with a high productivity project, c2p
2
H conglomerates of type HH each with two
projects with P = λYH , and cpHpM conglomerates of type MH with one project with P = λYH .17
Thus, there are (1 − c)pH + cp2H + cpHpM projects in C with P = λYH . Other measures can be
computed similarly.
Finally, conglomerates of type HL and ML do not participate in the external capital market.
They are (weakly) better off allocating capital internally than using the external capital market,
because the best they can do in the market is to supply the unit of capital in their low productivity
project and raise one unit for their higher productivity one. But they do not need the market to
accomplish this transaction. Furthermore, if the probability of raising capital in the external market
is less than one, they strictly prefer internal reallocation. The projects of these firms constitute the
set O.
17Notice that for a conglomerate G = {j, k} with t(j) = t(k) = H we have P j = P k = λYH , and for a conglomerate
G = {j, k} with t(j) =M and t(k) = H, we have P k = λYH .
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4.4 Conglomerates and the efficiency of capital allocation
In the following proposition we state and prove the central result of the paper. We show that
conglomeration can have a positive or a negative effect on the efficiency of capital allocation,
depending on the range of the pledgeability parameter λ. In the proposition, the efficiency of capital
allocation is measured as the “ex-ante” return on capital, calculated before the productivity of the
projects that lie inside and outside conglomerates is known (see the appendix for the expression).
Proposition 3 There are functions λ̂1(c) < λ̂2(c) such that:
a. For λ < λ̂1(c), the aggregate payoff is increasing in the degree of conglomeration,
b. For λ̂1(c) < λ < λ̂2(c), the aggregate payoff is decreasing in the degree of conglomeration, and
c. For λ > λ̂2(c), the aggregate payoff is non-decreasing in the degree of conglomeration.
In order to understand the proposition, notice that the capital that conglomerates of type ML
and HL reallocate internally goes from type L to either type M , or type H projects. If instead the
projects of type L were stand-alone firms, their capital would be supplied to the market. Whether
conglomeration is good or bad for overall efficiency depends on what would have happened to the
capital that these conglomerates reallocate internally, had it been supplied to the external market.
If most or all of the released capital would have ended up in type H projects, then conglomerates
are bad for efficiency because part of the capital they reallocate internally goes to projects of type
M . However, if little or none of the capital would have been reallocated to type H, the aggregate
payoff increases with conglomeration.
For low levels of pledgeability (λ < λ̂1(c)) the external market does a poor job at allocating
capital to type H projects, and thus decreasing the number of conglomerates reduces the efficiency
of capital allocation. This effect can be seen in Figure 3, Panel A, where the arrow shows the effect
of a decrease in the level of conglomeration, corresponding to the hypothetical exercise of busting
up conglomerates. A decrease in the degree of conglomeration increases the supply of capital to
the market. However, as Panel A shows, all the newly released capital ends up in the general
technology. Because the released capital was previously allocated internally by conglomerates to
either their M or H projects, the decrease in conglomeration over this range reduces the allocative
efficiency of the economy.
19
For intermediate values of λ, λ̂1(c) < λ < λ̂2(c), the market does a better job of allocating
capital than in the previous case. In this range of λ reducing the number of conglomerates is
beneficial for the efficiency of capital allocation. This case is illustrated in Figure 3, Panel B. In
this panel, both the initial and final levels of conglomeration are the same than in Panel A, however,
the degree of pledgeability is higher. Because of this higher pledgeability, all the capital released
to the market finds its way to high productivity projects. Thus, the decrease in conglomeration is
beneficial since some of this newly released capital was previously allocated to mediocre projects
by the LM conglomerates.
Notice that the bias towards internal investment of these conglomerates is due to limited pledge-
ability. A conglomerate of type LM does not supply capital to the market but rather allocates it
internally (even when there is unsatisfied demand from projects of type H), since projects of type
H cannot offer a sufficiently high return.18 In this range, the maximum return a type H project
can offer is lower than the cash flows that a project of typeM generates (i.e., λYH < YM ) and thus
it is privately optimal for the conglomerate to allocate internally whereas it is socially optimal to
supply its capital to the market.19
Finally, for higher levels of pledgeability, increasing conglomeration is never detrimental to the
aggregate payoff because all projects of type H receive capital in the external capital market. As
a result, transfers that take place inside the LM conglomerates are no longer suboptimal since the
best project in need of capital for the economy as a whole is now project M .
This proposition is the generalization of the result presented in the simple example of section
2. It shows that the simplifying assumptions that we made in that section are not necessary to
18One might wonder whether mergers between firms with H projects and conglomerates of type LM would not
eliminate the inefficiency. The answer is that such mergers would be subject to the same imperfection that curb
transactions in the external capital market (limited pledgeability). An acquisition at date t1 of a type H firm by a
type LM conglomerate, for example, basically consists of the type H firm exchanging its future date t2 cash flow for
a current payment made by the conglomerate LM . The inefficiency would be completely eliminated only under the
assumption that the conglomerate would be willing to pay the full YH for the assets of firm H. This is unlikely to
be the case if there is any specificity to the assets of H that cannot be captured by the conglomerate, for example,
if there is specific human capital invested in H. If the entrepreneur who runs firm H is necessary to generate its full
value, then it might be necessary to give him part of the rent generated by this firm ex-post (at date t2), and thus
the conglomerate LM would not be willing to pay the full value of the firm ex-ante (at date t1).
19We are assuming that firms cannot pledge cash flows of the first unit to raise the second unit of capital. However,
this simplifying assumption is not necessary for the results. If the first unit was pledgeable all firms would have
incentives to cross-pledge cash flows from the first unit in order to raise the second unit. This would complicate the
analysis of the external market equilibrium because we would need to keep track of a larger number of potential values
for P . Nevertheless, there would still be a range for the pledgeability parameter in which conglomerates ML would
have a socially inefficient bias towards internal reallocation. The only difference is that because overall pledgeability
is higher with this alternative assumption, both λ̂1(c) and λ̂2(c) would be lower.
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generate the equilibrium cost of internal capital markets. It also shows that a similar comparative
statics exercise holds in the general model - the cost of conglomeration kicks in for intermediate
pledgeability levels, for which the external capital market is most sensitive to the presence of
conglomerates.
5 The equilibrium level of conglomeration
In the previous section we analyzed the effect of conglomeration on the efficiency of capital alloca-
tion, assuming that the level of conglomeration was exogenously given. In this section we analyze
the equilibrium level of conglomeration. Proofs of the results discussed in this section are in the
Appendix.
As we described above, at date t0, entrepreneurs with projects can decide to form a two-project
conglomerate or remain as stand-alone firms. We assume that there is a cost d of conglomeration.
This can be thought of as the organizational costs incurred by the conglomerate due to its higher
complexity. In addition, d can capture other benefits and costs of conglomeration. For example,
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) conclude from various case studies of business groups in East
Asia that their “dominance lies in the privileges they solicit from the government.” Countries where
these privileges are high have a smaller d.
At date t0, the equilibrium level of conglomeration must satisfy:
UC − 2USA = d, (8)
where UC is the expected payoff of a two-project conglomerate and USA is the expected payoff of
a stand-alone project.
Figure 4, Panel A shows the same supply and demand schedule of Figure 2, for different levels
of capital supply. In Figure 4, we write the total supply of capital as a function of the degree of
conglomeration, K + T (c), where by Equation (7), T (c) ≡ (1 − c)pL + cp2L. Figure 4, Panel B
shows UC − 2USA as a function of the degree of conglomeration c. For each c in Panel B, there is
a corresponding capital supply, K + T (c), in Panel A. Notice that low levels of conglomeration are
associated with a large supply of capital to the market (T decreases with c).
We explain the derivation of the curve UC − 2USA in Panel B, starting at c =c. When con-
glomeration is at this low starting level, the supply of capital is sufficiently large so that all good
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projects receive capital. This can be seen in Panel A where supply is K+T (c). Starting from c =c,
an increase in conglomeration reduces the supply of funds and consequently raises the interest rate.
This can be seen in Panel A as the supply of capital moves from K + T (c) towards K + T (c2).
Since a stand-alone firm supplies its capital to the external market more often than a conglomerate,
it benefits from this increase more than a conglomerate does. This is shown in Panel B as a fall
in UC − 2USA when conglomeration goes from c to c2. For moderate levels of conglomeration
(from c2 to c3), further increases in c reduce supply so much that some good projects are unable
to raise capital. This can be seen in Panel A by shifting the supply of capital from K + T (c2)
to K + T (c3). Since stand-alone projects rely completely on the external market to raise capital
whereas conglomerates rely only to some extent (they can use their internal capital markets) the
payoff of a stand-alone firm falls relative to the payoff of a conglomerate. This is shown in Panel B
as an increase in UC−2USA when conglomeration goes from c2 to c3. Finally, for very high levels of
conglomeration, no good project raises capital and any increase in conglomeration (contraction in
supply) translates to an increase in the interest rate. This corresponds to cases in Panel A in which
capital supply is below K + T3. In this range stand-alone projects begin to benefit again from the
increase in the interest rate, generating the reduction in UC − 2USA in Panel B for conglomeration
levels above c3.
As one can see from direct examination of Panel B, there are two equilibrium levels of conglom-
eration in this example, namely c and c with c< c.20 The intuition for the existence of multiple
equilibria can be explained as follows. When c is low, the supply of capital to the external market
is large (because there are few conglomerates) and so all good projects in the economy (regardless
of whether they are part of conglomerates) receive capital. In turn, because the market works
well, it is beneficial for entrepreneurs to keep their projects as stand-alone firms rather than to
conglomerate. Thus there is an equilibrium with low c. Alternatively, when c is high, the supply of
capital to the market is small (because there are so many conglomerates) and so no good project
raises capital in the external capital market. In turn, because the external market works poorly,
entrepreneurs choose to conglomerate. Thus, there is an equilibrium with high c.
We show in the Appendix that the existence of the multiple equilibria of the type explained in
Figure 4 is a general feature of the model. More importantly, under certain conditions, we can show
20The third equilibrium (the middle one) is unstable and hence we do not discuss it further.
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that the low conglomeration equilibrium will be better from a social point of view. This result holds
even when we do not count the cost of conglomeration d in the aggregate payoff, and will only get
stronger if we do. The fact that the low conglomeration equilibrium can be socially superior is not
surprising given our previous findings that an exogenous increase in the degree of conglomeration
can hurt the equilibrium allocation of capital. However, the results in this section contribute by
showing that the main insight of the previous section remains even when we endogenize the degree
of conglomeration in the economy. In the ‘bad’ equilibrium, there is too much conglomeration from
a social point of view because even when capital is allocated efficiently inside the conglomerate the
reallocation of capital across conglomerates is reduced.
Furthermore, the current results make it clear that the model might generate a mismatch
between private and social incentives to conglomerate. Starting from the high conglomeration
equilibrium, a bust up of conglomerates would improve the equilibrium capital allocation if con-
glomeration is socially inefficient. However, given that high conglomeration constitutes a stable
equilibrium of the model, firms would not find it privately optimal to split up. This result suggests
a potential role for policies that directly discourage the presence of conglomerates in developing
economies.
6 Empirical and policy implications
In this section we discuss our theory’s empirical and policy implications. We also discuss some
anecdotal evidence that appears to be consistent with these implications.
Because our theory’s main implications are based on the effects of conglomerates on the external
market, a pre-condition for the model’s mechanism to work is that the reduction in external market
activity that the presence of conglomerates entails has to be a first order effect. Although there is
no systematic study on this issue, the sheer size of business groups as a fraction of the economy
in some countries suggests that this can be the case. Claessens, Fan, and Lang (2002) find that in
8 out of the 9 Asian countries they study, the top 15 family groups control more that 20% of the
listed corporate assets. In a sample of 13 Western European countries, Faccio and Lang (2002) find
that in 9 countries the top 15 family groups control more than 20% of the listed corporate assets.
Given that business groups consist of such a large fraction of the capital market in some countries,
it is highly plausible that their actions could have first-order effects on the behavior of the market
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as a whole.
Our theory makes the following empirical prediction about the relationship between conglom-
eration and the efficiency of capital allocation.
1. The level of conglomeration in a country’s corporate sector could be negatively
related to the economy-wide efficiency of capital allocation, even if conglomerates’
internal capital markets are privately efficient
This result follows directly from proposition 3. Because of its negative effect on the ability
of other firms to raise capital, conglomeration can decrease the efficiency of equilibrium capital
allocation even when internal capital markets are efficient.
There are several important aspects related to implication 1 that need to be discussed. First,
in order to test implication 1, one would need to measure the economy-wide efficiency of capital
allocation. One possibility is suggested by Wurgler (2000), who uses the country-level elasticity
of industry investment to industry value added to measure the efficiency of capital allocation.21
According to Wurgler, this elasticity provides a measure of whether capital is efficiently reallocated
from declining industries towards growing ones.22 Second, one would need to build an “aggregate
conglomeration” index for a large enough sample of countries. While we do not believe that such a
measure is currently available for many countries, it can, in principle, be constructed. For example,
for East Asia, Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) measure the fraction of firms that are affiliated
with business groups. With a large enough sample of countries, future research could examine
the empirical relationship between conglomeration and country-level measures of the efficiency of
capital allocation such as Wurgler’s.
A perhaps more fundamental concern is whether a negative relationship between conglomer-
ation and the efficiency of capital allocation would allow us to clearly accept our theory against
alternatives such as the possibility that conglomerates allocate capital inefficiently from a private
standpoint (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). If conglomerates do not allocate capital to their best
available option, the efficiency of capital allocation should decrease with conglomeration indepen-
21Wurgler’s main finding is that this elasticity is positively related to the level of financial development in cross-
country regressions.
22Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) use Wurgler’s measure to examine the relationship between an index of aggregate
external finance dependence and the efficiency of capital allocation. They argue that Wurgler’s within-year elasticity
of investment to value-added is specially likely to capture the idea of capital reallocation.
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dently of whether our mechanism is in operation. Fortunately, one can use additional implications
of the model in order to provide stronger evidence for it.
2. The effect of conglomeration on allocative efficiency is non-monotonic in the
level of investor protection. In particular, the effect is more strongly negative for
intermediate levels of investor protection
Result 2 also follows from proposition 3. This result is important because it provides for a way
to differentiate our empirical implications from those of a model in which conglomerates allocate
capital inefficiently. Existing models of inefficient investment in conglomerates, such as Scharfstein
and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) do not make clear predictions regarding
the relationship between the effect of conglomerates on efficiency and the level of investor protec-
tion. Other models have the implication that, as the financing-related benefits of conglomeration
decrease, costs of conglomeration such as less effective monitoring (Stein, 1997), coordination costs
(Fluck and Lynch, 1999), free cash-flow (Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002 and Inderst and Mueller,
2003) and incentive problems (Gautier and Heider, 2003) decrease the efficiency of conglomerates’
investments. However, these papers generally imply a monotonic relationship between the under-
lying imperfection in capital allocation and the efficiency of conglomerates.23 Thus, we believe that
the particular non-monotonicity that we identify is a novel implication of our model.24
An alternative way to test our model would be to examine the particular mechanism by which
conglomerates adversely affect the efficiency of capital allocation.
3. The level of conglomeration in a country’s corporate sector should be positively
related to the financing constraints faced by independent firms, and thus negatively
related to their growth
In our model, high-productivity independent firms are less likely to be able to raise capital in
the external market if the degree of conglomeration is high. This is the main mechanism by which
conglomerates adversely affect the equilibrium allocation of capital in the model, as explained in
Section 4.4.25
23The only exception seems to be Inderst and Mueller (2003). In their model, the (private) value of conglomeration
is highest when the underlying imperfection is in an intermediate range. Notice this suggests the opposite of our
implication that the social cost of conglomeration is highest for countries with moderate levels of investor protection.
24Notice, however, that a cross-sectional test of this non-monotonic relationship would require an even larger sample
of countries than a test of implication 1.
25In fact, the theory suggests that financing constraints could also be tightened for some types of conglomerates
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Because previous theory on internal capital markets generally ignores the effects that conglom-
eration might have on other firms in the economy, implication 3 is an additional implication that
is particular to our model. It appears that such an implication would be testable, conditional on
the construction of a conglomeration index for a large enough sample of countries (similarly to
implications 1 and 2). The theory also suggests a way of sharpening a test of the mechanism by
which conglomerates affect capital allocation.
4. The effect of conglomeration on the financing constraints faced by independent
firms should be particularly strong for countries with intermediate levels of investor
protection
The reasoning behind implication 4 is very similar to that behind implication 2. If investor pro-
tection is very low, high productivity firms cannot raise capital irrespective of conglomeration, and
if investor protection is very high all the inefficiencies disappear. Thus, the effect of conglomerates
on other firms’ financing constraints should be more pronounced for intermediate levels of investor
protection.26
One general problem with any empirical test of implications 1 to 4 is that the level of conglom-
eration is (generally) endogenous to the level of investor protection and the efficiency of capital
allocation in a country. While our theory also suggests that a model with endogenous conglom-
eration generates similar implications (section 5), for empirical purposes it might be desirable to
isolate exogenous variations of conglomeration. As we discuss in section 4, there is evidence that
corporate grouping affiliation is affected to a large extent by history and political pressure. One
might be able to use such sources of variation in order to identify experiments that facilitate testing
and identification.27
Finally, our theory generates the following policy implication.
5. Even if conglomerates have a negative effect on the efficiency of capital allocation,
with high productivity projects. However, because conglomerates’ internal capital markets relax their financing
constraints, we believe it is cleaner to focus only on independent firms.
26The only difference between implications 2 and 4 is that conglomerates can never increase the probability with
which independent firms raise capital. Thus the effect of conglomerates on other firms’ financing constraints is
(weakly) monotonic in the level of investor protection.
27One example, though in a different context, is Yafeh (1995), who uses the dissolution of the Japanese Zaibatsu
following World War II as a large scale experiment to study the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance.
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individual conglomerates will have no private incentives to dismantle. Deconglomer-
ation might require direct government intervention
Implication 5 is a direct consequence of the fact that the cost of conglomeration that we identify
in our paper is an externality.
We end this section by discussing a recent example of the relation between conglomerates and
the overall economy that appears to be consistent with our theory.
The Case of South Korea
The recent history of South Korea gives some anecdotal evidence for the predictions of our
theory. Up until the 1990’s, the Korean conglomerates, or chaebols, were credited with being one
of the most important factors in Korea’s rapid growth. This view appeared to change in the 1990’s,
as the chaebols began to be seen as an obstacle to growth. More importantly for our purposes, one
of the reasons for this change in perception is that the chaebols are believed to inhibit the growth
of small and medium sized firms, among other things, because most of the finance available was
concentrated on the chaebols (see The Financial Times, April 23, 1998, “Small business living with
the crumbs”).28 From the late 1990s, the Korean government has been exerting pressure on the
chaebols to slim their empires. As a consequence, “with the chaebol no longer dominating access to
South Korea’s huge pool of savings, credit began to flow to small- and medium-sized firms” (The
Economist, April 17, 2003, “Unfinished business”).
The Korean example is broadly consistent with the picture painted by our model. First, when
conglomeration was high, independent firms could not get capital. Second, despite this fact, the
conglomerates did not voluntarily dismantle and thus government action was required. Third, after
the conglomerates had started reforming, more financing was made available to independent firms.
Finally, the fact that the role of the chaebols changed from being the driver of economic growth in
the early stages of development to inhibiting development in its later stages could also be explained
by our model because it predicts a positive effect of conglomeration for low level of institutional
development and a negative effect at intermediate levels.
28Too much political power (as evidenced by a number of corruption scandals), almost total control of product
markets and excessive debt levels are other reasons why the chaebols were believed to be hampering growth.
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7 Conclusion
We develop an equilibrium model to understand how the efficiency of capital allocation depends
on the degree of conglomeration. We show that an increase in conglomeration can be detrimental
to capital allocation even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because of
the equilibrium effect of conglomerates on the efficiency of external capital markets. Our model
is consistent with anecdotal evidence on the role of business groups in developing countries. In
particular, the model gives a rationale for why the presence of business groups may inhibit the
growth of new independent firms due to lack of finance. Our results also suggest that efficient
internal capital markets is not a sufficient condition to advocate the presence of conglomerates
in developing economies. Conglomeration may impose a negative externality to other firms by
making it more difficult for good projects outside the conglomerate to raise funds. Finally, our
model suggests that even when the economy as a whole benefits from having fewer funds allocated
through internal capital markets, individual firms cannot be expected to bust up conglomerates
on their own. Thus, there might be a role for policies that directly discourage the presence of
conglomerates in developing economies.
One way to reinterpret our result is that, in an equilibrium framework, mitigating an agency
cost for only a few firms is not necessarily beneficial for the overall economy. This insight could po-
tentially be extended to the literature on financial intermediaries (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 1991;
Boyd and Smith, 1992; King and Levine, 1993; Galetovic, 1996). This literature has argued that
financial intermediaries perform several roles that aid the allocation of capital, such as discovering
information about productivity, pooling funds and diversifying risks. In the context of our model,
this reasoning suggests that financial intermediaries could increase pledgeability of cash flows in the
economy. However, our results on conglomeration suggest that it is important that banks increase
the aggregate pledgeability level (our parameter λ), as opposed to increasing pledgeability locally
for a group of firms with more direct relationships with banks. If the latter occurs, banks might
have similar effects to conglomerates: they might at the same time facilitate reallocation of capital
across firms in their local relationships, and decrease the efficiency of overall reallocation because
they compromise reallocation of capital across firms with different banking relationships.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We divide the proof in several steps. First, given E , sets S, C, and O, and any set of contracts offered by firms
that have projects in C, we find the optimal allocation rule for investors. Next, given E , and sets S, C, and O, we find
the optimal contracts offered by firms. As promised in the text, in this part we also show that the optimal contracts
P j and P k offered by a conglomerate {j, k} are identical to what two stand-alone firms {j} and {k} would offer if
the pledgeability constraint for these firms were P s ≤ P s s = j, k with P s defined as in the text. In the last step we
impose market clearing to derive Equations (4) and (4).
Step 1 (allocation rule). We take as given E , sets S, C, and O and the set of contracts offered by firms seeking
finance. Once the contracts are announced, investors allocate their capital. The following Lemma characterizes the
contracts that are taken and the allocation of capital to the general technology.
Lemma 1 There is a threshold level, R∗, such that investors allocate ω∗ = x−1(R∗) to the general technology and
• take all contracts that offer strictly more than R∗ (i.e., if P i > R∗, then ri = 1),
• do not take any contract that offers strictly less than R∗(i.e., if P i < R∗, then ri = 0), and
• take any fraction of the projects that offers exactly R∗.
Proof. With this allocation, all investment opportunities that do not receive capital yield a lower return than
all investment opportunities that do receive capital. As a result, no investor can profitably switch his capital to an
available investment opportunity. The precise level of R∗ is determined by a market clearing condition, as we show
below.
As the Lemma above indicates, investor maximization behavior does not pin down the allocation rule to contracts
offering exactly R∗. When there are more contracts offering weakly more than R∗ than there is capital available, not
all contracts offering exactly R∗ receive capital. In this case, investors are indifferent as to the allocation rule to
contracts offering exactly R∗. As we will see below, however, not all allocation rules to these contracts guarantee an
equilibrium of the offering stage. We describe the equilibrium rule to contracts offering exactly R∗ in Lemma 2.
Step 2 (optimal contracts). We still take E , and the sets S, C, and O as given, but now analyze the optimal
contract offered by firms seeking finance. Conglomerates either supply both units of capital to the market, demand
two units of capital, or opt out of the market completely. That is, there is no conglomerate that supplies one unit
of capital to the market and demands one unit of capital. This is because such transaction is weakly dominated by
internal reallocation. Therefore, we only analyze the optimal contracts offered by stand-alone firms that seek one
unit of capital and conglomerates that seek two units.
Lemma 2 The allocation rule for projects offering an amount different than R∗ is in Lemma 1. The equilibrium
allocation rule to projects offering exactly R∗ guarantees one unit of capital with certainty
• to contracts P i = R∗ when offered by a stand alone firm F = {i} with λYt(i) > R∗,
• to contracts P i = R∗ when offered by a conglomerate G = {i, j} with Yt(i) ≥ Yt(j) and Yt(i) > R∗, and
• to contracts P i = R∗ when offered by a conglomerate G = {i, j} with Yt(i) < Yt(j) and λ(Yt(j) + Yt(k))/2 > R∗,
and allocates capital with probability r∗ to all other contracts offering exactly R∗
The optimal contracts offered by firms seeking finance are as follows. A stand-alone firm F = {i} announces
P i =

R∗ if λYt(i) ≥ R∗
0 otherwise
. A conglomerate G = {i, j} with Yt(i) ≥ Yt(k) announces P i = R
∗ if λYt(i) ≥ R∗
0 otherwise
and P k =
R∗ if λ
2
(Yt(i) + Yt(j)) ≥ R∗
0 otherwise
.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, any allocation to projects offering exactly R∗ is consistent with investor maxi-
mization behavior. However, as we explain below, the particular rule in the Lemma 2 is the only one that guarantees
the existence of optimal offers by projects.
We now show the optimality of the contracts offered by firms given the allocation rule by investors. By construc-
tion of the set C, projects in this set benefit by raising capital at R∗. Consider the stand alone firm F = {i}. When
λYt(i) < R
∗, all feasible announcements by the firm must be strictly lower than R∗ and as a result the firm does not
raise capital regardless of the proposed contract. Thus, it cannot profitably deviate from the equilibrium contract.
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When λYt(i) > R
∗, the optimal strategy calls for proposing P i = R∗ and the allocation rule implies that the contracts
is taken with probability 1. The firm cannot deviate to a better contract. A higher announcement only increases
the amount paid with no effect on the probability of receiving capital, and a lower announcement leads to no capital
being allocated to the firm. When λYt(i) = R
∗, the equilibrium contract calls for P i = R∗ and the allocation rule
assigns capital to this firm with some probability r∗. Again, the firm cannot deviate from this strategy. It cannot
announce a higher amount due to the pledgeability constraint, and it does not benefit by offering less because that
would imply that the firm does not get capital at all..
Now, consider the conglomerate G = {i, j} with Yt(i) ≥ Yt(j). By the pledgeability constraint in Equation (3)
and the IC constraint P i ≥ P j , it follows that
P j ≤ λ
2
(Yt(i) + Yt(j)). (9)
We consider all possible cases. 1) When λYt(i) < R
∗, it follows by Equation (2) that P i < R∗ and, by the incentive
compatibility constraint P i ≥ P j , it must also be that P j < R∗. Thus the conglomerate cannot raise capital with any
feasible announcements. That is, it cannot do better than equilibrium strategy P i = P j = 0. 2) When λYt(i) = R
∗
we consider two cases: a) Yt(i) > Yt(j) and b) Yt(i) = Yt(j). In case a), we have that
λ
2
(Yt(i) + Yt(j)) < R
∗ so the
equilibrium strategy calls for P i = R∗ and P j = 0, and the conglomerate raises one unit of capital with probability
r∗. In this case, Equation (9) becomes P j < R∗ so the conglomerate cannot raise a second unit of capital with any
feasible announcement. As a result, the conglomerate does not benefit from deviating from P j = 0. By the limited
pledgeability constraint in Equation (2), the conglomerate cannot raise P i. Also, reducing P i is not optimal since that
leads to the conglomerate not raising any capital. In sum, the conglomerate cannot profitable deviate from P i = R∗.
In case b), we have that λ
2
(Yt(i)+Yt(j)) = R
∗ and so the optimal strategy calls for P i = P j = R∗ and each contract is
taken with probability r∗. Increasing either P i or P j is precluded by limited liability constraints. Decreasing any of
these announcements eliminates the possibility that that particular contract is taken. Thus, the conglomerate cannot
profitably deviate from these announcements. 3) When λYt(i) > R
∗ > λ
2
(Yt(i) + Yt(j)), the equilibrium strategy calls
for P i = R∗ and P j = 0 and the conglomerate raises one unit of capital with probability 1. In this case, Equation (9)
implies that P j < R∗. That is, the conglomerate cannot raise a second unit with any feasible announcement and thus
cannot profitably deviate from P j = 0. P i = R∗ is optimal because it allows the conglomerate to raise one unit with
probability one with the minimum announcement possible. 4) When λYt(i) > R
∗ = λ
2
(Yt(i) + Yt(j)), the equilibrium
strategy is P i = P j = R∗. Contract P i is taken with probability 1 and contract P j is taken with probability r∗.
Decreasing any of these two offers would lead to that particular contract not being taken. Also, the conglomerate
cannot raise any of the offers because the pledgeability constraint in Equation (3) binds for these values. 5) Finally,
λ
2
(Yt(i) + Yt(j)) > R
∗ the equilibrium strategy calls for P i = P j = R∗ and the equilibrium allocation is such that the
conglomerate receives two units of capital for sure. Clearly, there is no profitable deviation because the conglomerate
is getting each unit of capital with the minimum announcement possible.
Finally, note that, with the definition of P in the text, the contract offered to raise capital for any project i in the
economy, can be written as P i =

R∗ if P
i ≥ R∗
0 otherwise
regardless of whether the project is in a stand-alone firm or in
a conglomerate. Also, the probability of a project i receiving capital when P i = R∗ is 1 if P
i
> R∗ and r if P
i
= R∗
regardless of whether the project is in a stand-alone or in a conglomerate. For this reason, once we incorporate the
information about the type of firm project i belongs to in the definition of P
i
, we can treat project i as a stand-alone
firm.
The allocation rule in Lemma 2 is the only one that guarantees the existence of an optimal strategy for projects.
The key feature of the allocation rule is that it allocates capital for sure to projects that can potentially offer more. If
the allocation rule does not guarantee a unit of capital with certainty to those firms that can potentially offer more,
then these firms could offer R∗+ ε and get capital with probability 1 (by Lemma 1). But, in this case, an equilibrium
would not exist because ε can always be made smaller. Thus, the allocation rule above is the only one for which an
equilibrium always exist.
Step 3 (Market clearing). Combining the optimal announcement for each project i ∈ C in Lemma 2 with the
equilibrium allocation rule, we get that a project i ∈ C receives capital with certainty if P i > R∗, receives capital
with probability r∗ if P
i
= R∗, and does not receive capital if P
i
< R∗. The market clearing condition is then:
x−1(R∗) +
∫
{i∈C|P i>R∗}
di +
∫
{i∈C|P i=R∗}
r∗di = K+
∫
{i∈S}
di.
Because r∗ must be between zero and one, the value of R∗ satisfies
x−1(R∗) +
∫
{i∈C|P i>R∗}
di ≤ K+
∫
{i∈S}
di ≤ x−1(R∗) +
∫
{i∈C|P i≥R∗}
di.
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Proof of Proposition 2
In the text.
Proof of Proposition 3
We start by determining the probabilities that projects in C receive capital as a function of c and λ. This is a
simple application of Propositions 1 and 2. From Proposition 2, set C is formed by projects that belong to stand-alone
firms M and H, and by projects that belong to type MH conglomerates. Note that there are only three possible
values of P for projects in this set: λYH (for projects that belong to the H stand-alone firms and for the type H
project that belong to theMH conglomerate ), λ (YH+YM )
2
(for theM projects that belong to theMH conglomerate),
and λYM (for projects that belong to the M stand-alone firms). We denote these values as PH , PHM , and PM . We
also let rH , rHM , and rM be the probability that projects with P equal PH , PHM , and PM , respectively, receive
capital in the external market. We let T be the amount of liquidation, i.e., T ≡ (1 − c)pL + cp2L. We also let
YHM ≡ (YH + YM )/2
We explain the derivation of rH , the probability that projects with P = PH receive capital. As explained in the
text there are (1− c)pH + cp2H + cpHpM projects in C with P = λYH . This measure can be written more succinctly
as pH − cpLpH . For a given level of conglomeration c, we can write rH as:
rH =

0 if λYH < x(K + T )
K+T−x−1(λYH )
pH−cpLpH if x(K + T ) ≤ λYH < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
1 if λYH ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
The probability that projects with P = λYH get capital depends on whether the required return on capital (the
return of the general technology) is higher or lower than λYH . If λYH < x(K + T ), then these projects cannot get
capital because even when the entire capital supply is invested in the general technology the required return on capital
is too high. If λYH ≥ x(K + T ), then projects can get some capital. However, if λYH < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
then if all of the projects get capital the return on capital becomes lower than their pledgeable income. In this case
projects with P = λYH are rationed, and the return on capital is such that x(ω
∗) = λYH , or ω∗ = x−1(λYH). An
amount of capital equal to x−1(λYH) is invested in the general technology, and thus the probability that a project
gets capital is equal to K+T−x
−1(λYH )
pH−cpLpH . Finally, if λYH ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH) then all projects can get capital,
and rH = 1.
Exactly analogous reasoning leads to the following equations for rHM and rM :
rHM =

0 if λYHM < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH)
K+T−pH+cpLpH−x−1(λYHM )
cpHpM
if x(K + T − pH + cpLpH) ≤ λYHM <
< x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)
1 if λYHM ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)
rM =

0 if λYM < x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)
K+T−−pH+cpLpH−cpHpM−x−1(λYM )
(1−c)pM+cp2M
if x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH) ≤ λYM <
< x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH − (1− c)pM − cp2M )
1 if λYM ≥ x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH − (1− c)pM − cp2M )
The definition of rH , rHM and rM motivate the definition of the following functions of λ : λ˜1 = x(K + T )/YH ,
λ˜2 = x(K+T − pH + cpLpH)/YH , λ˜3 = x(K+T − pH + cpLpH)/YHM , λ˜4 = x(K+T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)/YHM ,
λ˜5 = x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH)/YM and λ˜6 = x(K + T − pH + cpLpH − cpMpH − (1− c)pM − cp2M )/YM . For
any c, the value of these functions satisfy λ˜1 < λ˜2 < · · · < λ˜6.
To lighten notation we let r′t ≡ ∂rt∂c for t = H, HM, and M and f(ω) = ωx(ω). The aggregate payoff function is
given by:
Π = f(ω) + (1− c) [pH(YH + rHYH) + pM (YM + rMYM )]+ (10)
c
2
p2H(2)(YH + rHYH) + p
2
M (2)(YM + rMYM ) + 2pHpM (2YH + rHYM + rHMYM )
+2pHpL(2YH) + 2pMpL(2YM )
where ω = K + (1− c)pL + cp2L − rH(pH − cpLpH)− rHM (cpHpM )− rM ((1− c)pM + cp2M ). We analyze dΠdc in all the
regions defined by λ˜k k = 1, 2 . . . 6. We denote by
∂Π
∂c
the derivative of Π wrt c assuming that rH , rHM and rM are
constants:
∂Π
∂c
= pLpH(1− rH)(YH − f ′(ω)) + pHpM (1− rH)(YH − YM )+ (11)
+ pM (1− pM )(1− rM )(YM − f ′(ω)) + pHpM (rHM − 1)(YM − f ′(ω))
For λ < λ˜1, rH = rHM = rM = 0 and since r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0 we can use equation 11 to obtain
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
=
pLpH(YH − f ′(ω)) + pHpM (YH − YM ) + pMpL(YM − f ′(ω)) > 0 since f ′(ω) = x(ω) + ωx′(ω) ≤ x(ω) < YM < YH .
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For λ˜1 < λ < λ˜2, rH ∈ (0, 1), rHM = 0 and rM = 0 also r′H 6= 0 and r′HM = r′M = 0. Also in this region, simple
algebra leads to ∂ω
∂c
= 0. Thus, dΠ
dc
= pLpH(1−rH)YH+pHpM (1−rH)(YH−YM )+pMpLYM+r′H [(1−c)pHYH+cp2HYH+
cpHpMYM ] and r
′
H =
−pL+p2L+rHpHpL
pH−cpLpH . In the limit as λ→ λ˜2, rH → 1 and
dΠ
dc
= pMpLYM−pMpL[γYH+(1−γ)YM ] <
0 where γ = (1−c+cpH)/(1−cpL). Also ∂∂λ
 
dΠ
dc

= ∂
∂rH
 
dΠ
dc
∂rH
∂λ
. Since x() is a decreasing function ∂rH
∂λ
is increasing.
And since ∂
∂rH
 
dΠ
dc
= −pHpLYH − pHpM (YH − YM ) + pHpL[γYH + (1− γ)YM ] < 0 then ∂∂λ
 
dΠ
dc
< 0.
If dΠ
dc λ˜1
≤ 0 then we define λ̂1 = λ˜1. If dΠdc λ˜1 > 0 then since ∂∂λ
 
dΠ
dc
< 0 and dΠ
dc λ˜2
< 0, there is a λ∗ ∈ (λ˜1, λ˜2)
such that dΠ
dc
|λ∗ = 0. In this case we define λ̂1 = λ∗. We also define λ̂2 = λ˜2. So far we have shown that to the left
of λ̂1,
dΠ
dc
is positive, and from λ̂1 to λ̂2,
dΠ
dc
is negative. Left to prove is that to the right of λ̂2,
dΠ
dc
is non-negative.
For λ˜2 < λ < λ˜3, rH = 1, rHM = rM = 0 and r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0. Using equation 11,
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
=
pMpL(YM − f ′(ω)) > 0.
For λ˜3 < λ < λ˜4, rH = 1, rHM ∈ (0, 1), rM = 0 and r′HM 6= 0 and r′H = r′M = 0. Also in this region, simple alge-
bra leads to ∂ω
∂c
= 0. Thus, dΠ
dc
= pMpLYM + pHpMrHMYM + cpHpMr
′
HMYM and r
′
HM =
−pL+p2L−+pHpL+rHMpHpM
cpHpM
.
Substituting the value of r′HM and simplifying leads to
dΠ
dc
= 0.
For λ˜4 < λ < λ˜5, rH = 1, rHM = 1, rM = 0 and r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0. Using equation 11,
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
=
pM (1− pM )(YM − f ′(ω)) > 0
For λ˜5 < λ < λ˜6, rH = 1, rHM = 1, rM ∈ (0, 1) and r′M 6= 0 and r′HM = r′M = 0. Also in this region, simple
algebra leads to ∂ω
∂c
= 0. dΠ
dc
= pMpLYM + pHpMYM − pMrMYM + p2MrMYM + r′M ((1 − c)pMYM + cp2MYM ) and
r′M =
−pL+p2L+pLpH−pHpM−rM (−pM+p2M )
(1−c)pM+cp2M
. Substituting the value of r′M and simplifying leads to
dΠ
dc
= 0.
Finally, for λ > λ˜6, rH = 1, rHM = 1, rM = 1 and r
′
H = r
′
HM = r
′
M = 0. Using equation 11,
dΠ
dc
= ∂Π
∂c
= 0.
Thus, to the right of λ̂2,
dΠ
dc
is non-negative.
Proof of results of section 5
We modify the model so that firms choose whether to conglomerate at date t0. If two firms choose to conglomerate
they pay a cost d. This cost can be thought of as organizational costs that the conglomerate incurs due to its higher
complexity.
Let USA be the expected payoff of a stand-alone project and UC be the expected payoff of a conglomerate
(excluding the cost d). Then
USA = pH(YH + rH(YH −R)) + pM (YM + rM (YM −R)) + pLR
UC = p2H(2YH + 2rH(YH −R)) + p2M (2YM + 2rM (YM −R)) + 2pHpM (2YH + rH(YM −R) + rHM (YM −R))
+ 2pHpL(2YH) + 2pMpL(2YM )
Characterizing the equilibrium level of conglomeration
To concentrate on the most interesting region of the parameter space, we assume that
Assumption 3
a. x(K + p2L) > λYH
b. x(K + pL − pH) < λYHM
Figure 3, panel A shows the reallocation market for different levels of conglomeration. In this figure K + T3 ≡
x−1(λYH) and K + T2 ≡ x−1(λYH) + pH − cpLpH , and K + T3 ≡ x−1(λYHM ) + pH − cpLpH . Figure 3, panel B
shows UC − 2USA as a function of c. In this figure, c1 = K+pL−x
−1(λYHM )−pH
pL−p2L−pLpH
, c2 =
K+pL−x−1(λYH )−pH
pL−p2L−pLpH
, and
c3 =
K+pL−x−1(λYH )
pL−p2L
.(Assumption 3 (a) guarantees that c3 < 1 and assumption 3 (b) guarantees that c1 > 0). These
values are chosen so that when c ∈ (c1, c2] then the supply of capital K+T ∈ [K+T2,K+T1), when c ∈ (c2, c3] then
K + T ∈ [K + T3,K + T2), and when c ∈ (c3, 1] then K + T < K + T3. To compute UC − 2USA, we need the date t1
equilibrium allocation ( rH , rHM , and rM ) and return R. We get these values from figure 2, panel A. For example, in
the region where K +T ∈ [K +T2,K +T1), rH = 1 and rHM = rM = 0 and R is calculated where demand intersects
supply. In the region where K + T ∈ [K + T3,K + T2), rH ∈ (0, 1], rHM = rM = 0 and R = λYH . Finally, in the
region where K+T > K+T3, rH = rHM = rM = 0 and R is again calculated where demand intersects supply. Next
we take the date t1 equilibrium values and plug them in U
SA − 2UC .
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In Figure 3, panel B, the level of d satisfies
d ∈ [max{2pHpL(YH − x(K + p2L)) + 2pMpL(YM − x(K + p2L)) + 2pHpM (YH − YM ), 2pMpL(YM − λYH)}, (12)
min{2pHpL(YH − λYH) + 2pMpL(YM − λYH) + 2pHpM (YH − YM ), 2pMpL(YM − λYHM )].
In this case there are two equilibria, the high conglomeration equilibrium at c and the low conglomeration
equilibrium at c (the equilibrium level of c between other c and c is not stable so we do not consider it in the
discussion). As can be seen from figure 3, panel A, in the high conglomeration equilibrium there is little supply of
funds to the market and as a result the reallocation market works poorly (no reallocation to good projects). As
a result it does not pay to be a stand alone. In the low conglomeration equilibrium, the supply of funds is larger
and as a result the external market works better. Since good projects do get capital in equilibrium, it pays to be a
stand-alone project.
Welfare comparison between the two equilibria
For a sufficiently steep x(.) function, the equilibrium with low conglomeration is better from society’s point of
view. In this proof, we also assume that d satisfies the condition in equation 12.
First we define what we mean by a ‘steeper’ x(.) function. We start with any x(.) function that leads to two
equilibrium levels of conglomeration c and c with respective date t1 equilibrium return R and R. We also define ω as
the amount of capital going to the general technology in the high conglomeration equilibrium. We consider a family
of x(.) functions that pass through the high conglomeration equilibrium, that is all x(.)function in this family satisfy
x(ω) = R. For each x(.) we define ∆ω as x(ω +∆ω) =R. That is, ∆ω is the additional amount of capital that has
to be invested in the general technology to drive the return down from R to R. Intuitively, the smaller the ∆ω, the
‘steeper’ the x(.) function.
We show that there is a level ∆̂ω such that for all x(.) functions in the family defined above with ∆ω < ∆̂ω, the
low conglomeration equilibrium is the better one.
First, notice that for a given set of parameters {YH , YM , pH , pL.pM , d} the equilibrium returns R to R satisfy:
2pMpL(YM −R) = d
2pHpLYH − 2pMpLYM −R(2pHpL + 2pMpL) + 2pHpM (YH − YM ) = d
These expressions are the expansion of USA − 2UC at the low and high conglomeration equilibria. From the
expressions, it is clear that the return in the date t1 reallocation market is not affected by the x(.) function . However,
the level of c at the low conglomeration equilibrium will be not be the same as different amounts of capital need to be
released to the external market to achieve a return of R. In other words, for the family of x(.) functions we consider,
there are two equilibria: (c, R), and (c(∆ω),R).The only unknown is c(∆ω).
To solve for c(∆ω), we use the market clearing conditions at the two equilibria:
K + (1− c)pL + cp2L = ω
K + (1− c)pL + cp2L = ω +∆ω + pH − cpLpH
These expressions follow from the fact that at the high conglomeration equilibrium rH = rHM = rM = 0 and at the
low conglomeration equilibrium rH = 1 and rHM = rM = 0. Letting c= c −∆c, subtracting one equation from the
other, and simplifying leads to:
∆c =
pH − cpLpH +∆ω
pLpM
We use equation 10 to compute Π(c) − Π(c). We do not consider the cost d of conglomeration in the aggregate
payoff. Including this cost only helps our result since the number of conglomerates is smaller and consequently so is
the total cost of conglomeration in the low conglomeration equilibrium. Using the expression for ∆c and after some
algebraic simplification:
Π(c)−Π(c) = [(ω +∆ω)x(ω +∆ω)− ωx(ω)]−∆ωYM+
pH(YH − YM )(1− c(1− pH))
This expression evaluated at ∆ω = 0 is pH(YH − YM )(1 − c(1 − pH)) > 0 and its derivative with respect to ∆ω is
x(ω +∆ω) + (ω +∆ω)x′(ω +∆ω)− YM < 0 because the second term is negative and YM > x(ω +∆ω). Therefore,
there is a level ∆̂ω such that for all x() with ∆ω < ∆̂ω the low conglomeration equilibrium is better.
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